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Executive summary
Companies must be part of any lasting solution to many of the pressing 
environmental and social problems facing the world.  All companies do good 
things and bad things, often at the same time. The essence of the debate over 
Corporate Responsibility1 (CR) is whether governance of the good and bad 
things companies do should be left to market forces and state regulation or 
whether companies should deliberately set out to do good things beyond the 
minimum required to achieve their financial goals.   
Those opposed to corporate responsibility from the political ‘Left’ argue that  
CR is a business-driven palliative to divert attention from the need for proper, 
enforceable regulation. Critics from the ‘Right’ argue that deliberate attempts 
to manage a company’s environmental and social impacts beyond those 
required by law and market forces, has no legitimacy. Moreover, they argue it 
risks diverting management’s attention from its main task and sphere of 
competence, and is likely to lead to misguided actions and/or destruction of 
value.
This paper argues that the ‘leave it to market forces within the rules of the 
game’ position may be tenable if the rules are both sound and universally 
enforced. Under such circumstances CR, beyond obeying the rules and paying 
taxes, would be largely discretionary. However, there are many instances 
where the rules are weak and/or not enforced. Since 1989 the nature and 
effect of globalisation has changed the state of governance radically: firstly, 
governments alone are less able to manage public interest issues to the extent 
traditionally expected of them; secondly, the lack of effective governance of 
global issues is becoming more apparent and urgent; thirdly, companies do 
business in many weak and failed states where governance is both lacking and 
often corrupt.  Companies are finding themselves caught up in the de facto
governance of public issues, whether they or the rest of society like it or not. It 
is therefore incumbent on companies, government agencies and civil society 
pressure groups to make this new governance reality work as well as possible. 
The key question is where this new form of CR is leading. Is it, as those 
arguing against CR from both the left and right of the political spectrum assert,  
risking prolonging a period of inadequate governance by letting reluctant state 
authorities off the hook? Or is it part of an evolving movement towards more 
effective global governance? The paper argues that CR is an inescapable part 
of doing business at this time. It is legitimised by the current governance 
deficit, both globally on some issues and in many states; and by companies’ 
power to make a positive difference, within their spheres of influence, on 
environmental and human rights issues where they operate. However, all 
involved in this pragmatic evolution of de facto governance processes should 
consider this – at least theoretically – as an ultimately transitory, if long term, 
phenomenon. It is further argued that all involved should work together to 
1 For a cross-section of definitions of Corporate Responsibility see: 
http://www.som.cranfield.ac.uk/som/research/centres/ccr/mission.asp accessed December 20th 2007  
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assist the development of better de jure processes. It is in the long term 
interests of the companies that are taking a lead in addressing these issues of 
business to society, to work for a level playing field, on which they can 
compete fairly with other companies which take a free ride on CR matters. 
That implies that leading companies and their associations should be actively 
lobbying governments for better regulation, not less.  If and when the 
governance of company environmental and social impacts is firmly brought 
within the rules of the game, then CR can perhaps return to being largely 
discretionary – but that time, if ever, is a long way off.  
It remains an open question: in the face of the greatly increased complexity of 
the issues facing global society, whether governments alone, however well-
organised, professional and far-seeing they are, can even theoretically, be able 
to solve the major environmental and societal issues on their own? 
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Introduction
This Occasional Paper originated in the 2007 Cranfield MBA students’ 
conference. Cranfield Emeritus Professor David Myddelton and David Grayson, 
debated the motion that: "There is only one social responsibility of business – 
to engage in activities designed to increase profits, so long as it stays within 
the rules of the game." 
In the course of the debate, and during contributions at the same conference 
from two other Davids: Prof David Henderson, the former OECD Chief 
Economist and CR critic; and Hermes Investment Committee Chairman: David 
Pitt-Watson, it appeared that some refinement of the areas of disagreement on 
CR, might be possible. 
Specifically, although there might be continuing argument about the precise 
terminology, activities for which there was a business case could be broadly 
accepted. Instead, the disagreement focussed more on why, and in what 
circumstances, companies might have additional responsibilities. This paper is 
an initial attempt to answer this. Like all the Occasional Papers that the 
Doughty Centre plans to produce, this is designed to inform and provoke 
further debate and inquiry. 
Should companies try to do good things?    
When it comes to trying to address the great issues of our time: energy, global 
warming, biodiversity losses, water scarcity, poverty, illiteracy, human rights – 
all wrapped up in the concept of ‘Sustainable Development’ – businesses are 
sometimes part of the problem but also, by virtue of the huge role they play in 
our lives, they must be part of any lasting solution. Effective action will mostly 
be in places where companies directly operate but for some, particularly large 
trans-national companies, action may be on a global scale. 
There is probably no such thing as a wholly good or bad company. All 
companies do good things and bad things, often at the same time, as 
summarised in Table 1. 
As David Vogel2 has argued: 
“People are rarely consistent in their ethical behaviours, as numerous 
psychological studies have shown. An individual can cheat on his spouse and 
file an honest income tax return, or be a model employee and an irresponsible 
parent… So if it is difficult to judge the overall ethics of an individual, it is 
certainly more so in the case of complex business organizations. Few firms 
widely regarded as socially responsible consistently exhibit ethical behaviors, 
while even the most criticized are not without virtues.”3
2 David Vogel teaches business ethics at UC Berkeley's Haas School of Business and is the author of "The 
Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility." 2005 – Brookings Institute 
3 Vogel, David  February 13, 2007  “When do 'good' firms go 'bad'? Ranking corporations by ethics is 
popular, but telling the good guys from the bad is not clear-cut.” Los Angeles Times
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TABLE 1 
Good things Bad things 
x Valued product/service
x Income & training for 
employees
x Profit for investors
x Taxes for public services
x Positive impact on 
community
x Donations to good causes?
x Leadership on sustainability 
x Leadership on ethical 
business 
x Leadership on positive human 
rights impact
x Harmful product/service
x Exploitation of consumers
x Exploitation of employees 
(poor health & safety and 
working conditions)
x Monopolistic profits
x Excessive pay gap between 
top & bottom
x Negative impact on 
community
x Unpaid for environmental 
costs 
x Direct abuse of human rights 
x Complicity in human rights 
abuse by others
Explaining table 1 
The underlined ‘good things’ make up a large part of the reason why 
companies make such an important contribution to our material well-being. 
That this positive contribution is less well appreciated in Europe, certainly than 
it is in the USA, is a reputation issue that business in Europe should collectively 
address. The underlined ‘bad things’ are essentially the flip side of the ‘good 
things’. In a well regulated system, it would be hoped that they would largely 
be prevented. However, even in the supposedly best regulated countries, it 
would be easy to cite instances of bad practice under each bullet point.  
Donations to good causes is questioned as a ‘good thing’ because the 
dominance of the corporate philanthropy tradition in a number of countries has 
for too long given this pre-eminence in the popular understanding of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR). Where corporate philanthropy is culturally expected 
or where it is, in effect, a contribution to a company’s community relations and 
good reputation generally, it is fine. Where it is little more than giving away 
shareholder’s money to enhance the personal social status of company 
directors, it is clearly a bad thing. In any case the donations budget of even 
the most ‘generous’ company pales into insignificance compared to the impact 
on society, both good and bad, of the company’s mainstream operations. It is 
how that impact is understood and managed which is the way in which the 
concept of corporate responsibility is increasingly understood. A company 
cannot claim to be responsible because it supports environmental projects, if it 
is an inveterate polluter; or claim to be a responsible business because it 
supports local schools if it neglects its own staff training and development 
needs. It cannot say it is responsible because it supports HIV/AIDS charities if 
it discriminates against a member of its own staff when they become HIV 
positive.
The ‘good things’ in italics are the frontier questions in public issue governance 
areas, in which – it is argued in this paper – companies, especially large ones, 
are increasingly being involved and being expected to play a positive part. The 
‘bad things’ in italics are, again, the flip side of the ‘good things’ with the 
additional and highly contentious issue of the extent to which a company is 
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complicit in the human rights abuses of third parties they are dealing with, 
such as governments, suppliers and contractors. 
The case for and against CR
The fundamental question is, and this is the essence of the debate over 
corporate responsibility, should the governance of good and bad things 
companies do, be left to market forces and state regulation; or should 
companies deliberately set out to do good things beyond the minimum 
required to pursue their medium term financial targets? Some of the 
arguments which have been advanced for and against Corporate Responsibility 
are set out in Table 2. 
TABLE 2  
Summary case against CR Summary case for CR 
x Doing good is either an 
ingredient of and/or a by-
product of pursuit of profits 
x Companies are not public 
services 
x Case for CR is remake of 
discredited old case for public 
enterprise 
x Governments’ job to look after 
public interest issues 
x CR is an inadequate substitute 
for government regulation 
x Companies have no legitimacy to 
interfere in public policy issues 
x Distraction of management from 
main value-adding tasks 
x Well-meaning but ignorant or 
misguided social intervention 
may actually destroy value 
x Markets need regulation 
x Business needs ethical values 
e.g. ‘do as you would be done 
by’
x These issues traditionally dealt 
with by national governments & 
established social norms and 
pressures  
x World has changed since 1989 
with the collapse of the 
Communist regimes of eastern 
and central Europe which 
ushered in a new era of 
globalisation 
x World struggling to govern itself 
x Radical changes in state of 
governance 
x Regulations often weak & un-
enforced
x Therefore companies obliged to 
take on this new, if 
uncomfortable, CR role.  
Criticism of CR comes from both the political ‘Left’, which wants more 
government regulation and from the ‘Right’ which favours the free market with 
as little regulation as possible. Critics from the ‘Left’ see CR as a totally 
inadequate substitute for enforceable regulation4. They tend to regard CR as a 
deliberate invention by the business sector to promote self-governance of 
corporate environmental and social impact issues; and as a way of fending off 
proper government regulations. In fact, this paper asserts, CR strategies and 
practices have largely developed as a result of a governance deficit. De jure
regulation is often weak and un-enforced. Leading company CR practices have 
been partly self-generated in the light of company operational experience and 
4 See, for example: Korten, David 1996 When corporations rule the world Berrett-Koehler
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partly in response to civil society pressure and increasing expectations on 
company performance in these areas. This argument is developed further in 
the ‘rules of the game’ section below. 
Critics of CR from the ‘Right’ regard CR as an unhelpful and costly distraction 
from the main role of business. They are not suggesting that companies should 
behave irresponsibly or unethically. Their main point is that doing good is 
either an ingredient of, or a by-product of, pursuit of profits, not an objective 
in its own right. “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or 
the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own 
interest.” (Adam Smith)5 Self-interested business will naturally seek to 
minimise avoidable costs such as energy usage and waste disposal, and will 
also pay due regard to ethical practices, stakeholder interests and wider social 
impacts, including human rights, in so far as they impact on the company’s 
reputation and licence to operate. Milton Friedman himself recognised this in 
arguing that: “There is one and only one social responsibility of business—to 
use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so 
long as it stays within the rules of the game”6, which is to say, engages in 
open and free competition without deception or fraud. Friedman recognised 
that “rules of the game” could include the prevailing ethical standard. The anti-
CR case7 is that by introducing environmental and social objectives beyond 
those required by the nature of a company’s business model and the rules of 
the game, serious issues of loss of management focus, incompetence and 
legitimacy need to be addressed. To quote Adam Smith again “Virtue is more 
to be feared than vice, because its excesses are not subject to the regulation 
of conscience.”  For conscience also read reputation and brand value. 
Those who argue against CR, it seems, basically accept the so-called ‘business 
case’ for CR which is summarised in table 3 below8.   
TABLE 3 
The Business Case for CR – it helps 
x Risk management  
x Reputation management 
x Staff recruitment, retention and motivation 
x Market growth 
x Product or service differentiation 
x New business opportunities 
x Cost savings 
x Access to and lower cost of capital
In effect, free market critics of CR regard activities for which there is seen to 
be a business case, as part of doing normal business in pursuit of profits. What 
5 Smith, Adam, 1776 Wealth of Nations book 2 chapter 1 
6 Milton Friedman ‘Capitalism and Freedom’ 1962 
7 See for example:– Henderson, David  – Misguided Virtue Institute for Economic Affairs: 
http://www.iea.org.uk/files/upld-release5pdf?.pdf – accessed December 20th 2007  
8 Sourced from: Grayson, David and Hodges, Adrian 2004 Corporate Social Opportunity Greenleaf; 
Corporate Sustainability - An Investor Perspective The Mays Report – Australia 2004; Arthur D. Little “The 
Business Case” (2002) Business in the Community 
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they argue against is the idea that companies should be expected deliberately 
to set out to do good things beyond activities in pursuit of profits. In other 
words beyond the minimum required to maximise shareholder value9, which is 
the commonly asserted business objective.  That minimum may be well below 
what environmental and human rights advocates demand but – critics of CR 
argue –  it is up to those advocates to convince national governments and, in 
turn, international governance agencies to make the necessary regulatory 
changes. It is not, they argue, the job of companies to get involved in these 
issues. Indeed, the argument goes further to assert that intervention by 
companies into issues which are the proper preserve of  governments actually 
lets the existing governments, however weak and corrupt, off the hook and 
does nothing to encourage them to start doing what they should be doing10. In 
other words it prolongs indefinitely, weak governance. 
Those who argue for CR need to take these points very seriously. It is possible, 
even likely, that some of the basic underlined ‘good things’ in Table 1 above, 
could be reduced by insistence that companies take on board environmental 
and social objectives beyond that required by their business model – at least in 
the short to medium term. The pro-CR lobby needs to be able to demonstrate 
four things:  
- First, that the traditional time scale of the market is too short given 
the nature of sustainability issues companies are increasingly facing.  
- Secondly, that there has been a significant “power-shift” towards 
markets and international businesses since the collapse of the 
Communist regimes and the privatisation and liberalisation of many 
markets. 
- Thirdly, that in consequence, the “rules of the game” governing the 
private enterprise impacts on public interest issues (or “externalities” 
as economists call them), are neither adequate for today’s conditions 
nor in any case being enforced.  
- Fourthly, that involvement by companies in the de facto governance 
of such issues, including establishing voluntary guidelines and 
principles, can be done in a way that leads inexorably to the 
establishment of more legitimate, de jure governance processes. 
1. Timescale
The Brundtland Commission, formally known as the UN-convened World 
Commission on Environment and Development11 in 1987 defined Sustainable 
Development as  
‘Development which meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the abilities of future generations to meet their own 
needs’.  
9 “What matters is not investor holding periods but rather the market’s valuation horizon—the number of 
years of expected cash flows required to justify the stock price. While investors may focus unduly on near-
term goals and hold shares for a relatively short time, stock prices reflect the market’s long view. Studies 
suggest that it takes more than ten years of value-creating cash flows to justify the stock prices of most 
companies.”  Rappaport, Alfred – Ten ways to create shareholder value – Harvard Business Review Online – 
accessed December 20th 2007 
10 This appears to be the criticism of CR made by Reich, Robert in Supercapitalism – 2007  Borzoi Books; 
also Bakan, Joel 2005 ‘The Corporation’ Robinson Publishing 
11World Commission on Environment and Development 1987. Our Common Future - Oxford University Press    
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The market is not able to take the needs of future generations into account 
unless consumers and investors demand it through their market choices or 
rule makers enforce it. It has been estimated that a tax of $85 per ton of 
carbon emitted would provide the right signal for the market to bring about the 
necessary investment and spending adjustments to address Climate Change12.
(See research by Dr Chris Hope of the Judge Institute in Cambridge, using a 
model of climate change which assesses the costs and benefits of various 
mitigation and adaptation strategies. However, there is still much argument 
about the appropriate rate of time discount used in the calculations.) 
Green consumers and ethical investors are increasing in numbers but are still 
far too small a proportion of the whole to have a major impact. Rule-makers 
globally are on the whole, so far, either unable or unwilling to do what would 
be required. Like the political horizons of many rule-makers, many would 
argue that markets are essentially short to medium term and financial returns 
are geared to that time-scale. Unless business leaders can be convinced that 
the long term sustainability of their companies is at stake and, in turn, can 
persuade investors to take a longer view, this will not change unless or until 
some kind of catastrophe changes the paradigm. 
2. Power-shift – New global realities
It is the traditional and legitimate role of governments to look after the public 
interest. Economists have always accepted that private companies create 
public value from which they receive no revenue, and public cost for which 
they do not pay. These are called externalities and it is entirely reasonable for 
governments to regulate, tax and/or subsidise companies to take account of 
them. Laws concerning restraint of trade, monopoly, labour rights, pollution, 
building regulations are all examples of how governments have traditionally 
tried to regulate the market to operate in the wider public interest. The main 
case for the pro-CR lobby rests on three assertions about the state of 
governance: firstly, that in a global, connected society, governments alone are 
no longer able effectively to look after the public interest in the way just 
described; secondly, that the lack of effective governance of global issues is 
becoming more apparent and urgent; thirdly, that companies do business in 
many weak and failed states where governance is both lacking and often 
corrupt. 
Post 1989, and the implosion of the Communist regimes of eastern and central 
Europe, globalisation has taken a new form. It has created an almost 
unbounded presumption for the free market. The Information and 
Communications Technology explosion has enabled unprecedented global 
connectivity. Business is now 24/7. Flows of finance, information and trade 
take little heed of state boundaries. This has created international 
competitiveness pressures which have much reduced governments’ ability to 
regulate, tax and provide public welfare. In addition, problems of a global 
dimension, such as climate change, ecosystem losses, water deficits, poverty 
issues, health issues, human rights and corruption, are growing with a speed 
12 Comments by Dr Chris Hope – European Academy for Business in Society Annual Colloquium September 
2007 – noted by authors – See also: 
www.eabis.org/csrplatform/colloquium/2007/2007proceedings/ClimateChangeResourceCentre/ 
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and potential scale of impact greater than ever before, exacerbated by rapid 
population growth. So, not only have national governments lost autonomous 
power, the implications of the long-standing deficit in global governance are 
even more pressing. Power has shifted, particularly towards large, 
transnational companies – and especially now to a new generation of global 
enterprises13.
Recognition and acceptance of this power shift is critical to the case for CR14. If 
there were a world of internationally collaborating, national governments 
holding corporations to account through strong internal regulations backed by 
strong international law and enforcement institutions, then CR would be far 
less important. It could perhaps revert to how most companies interpreted 
CSR prior to 1989, which was mainly a discretionary approach to behaving 
ethically and investing in community relations and corporate philanthropy. It 
would not require companies to take a pro-active role in addressing public 
interest issues unless it was specifically in the immediate business interests of 
the company to do so. However, such an effective regulatory environment is 
highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. The ‘rules of the game’ will remain in 
de jure terms weak and un-enforced. Whether the public or the companies 
themselves like it or not, companies will be involved for many years to come in 
decision-making which greatly affects the public interest and which 
governments alone will fail adequately to address. In other words, companies 
are inescapably involved in public policy issues. 
This is giving many CEOs, keen to maximise shareholder value, an increasing 
number of difficult decisions, like those described by Chris Marsden in the 
European Business Forum’s ethics debate ‘When in Rome …?’ 
“You have been approached to join a working group of business leaders 
to produce a report on global warming. One of your colleague directors 
has come up with a proposal to relocate one of your plants to India to 
benefit from cheaper labour and lower health and safety regulations. 
Your Africa area manager is pressing you to sign a lucrative contract 
which entails a 30% facilitation fee, most of which you know will end up 
in the pocket of the trade minister. You have a strong equal 
opportunities policy in Europe, based on EU standards, but your 
business development in the Middle East depends on not appointing 
women to key positions. You are being offered excellent terms by a 
South American government for a major investment opportunity but you 
know this is strongly opposed by the local indigenous community. You 
are already facing criticism in the press for using the security forces of 
another South American country to defend your assets from attack by 
insurgent groups. You source manufactured materials from the Far East 
and suspect these factories use child labour. These are issues that are 
properly the job of governments to resolve and set rules for, but you 
know that they are neither individually nor collectively likely to do so.”15
13  For a good discussion of the nature of the new global as opposed to multinational businesses see article 
by  the President and CEO of IBM – Samuel J. Palmisano – 2006. The Globally Integrated Enterprise – 
Foreign Affairs, May/June 2006;
14 For the implications for business: see the conclusions of a group of international business leaders: 
“Challenges and Choices: Tomorrow’s Global Company Inquiry 2007 – Centre for Tomorrow’s Company 
www.tomorrowscompany.com/global/default.aspx accessed December 20th 2007 
15 Marsden, Chris 2007 “When in Rome..?  - European Business Forum ,Issue 31, Winter 2007, page 20.  
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3. New Rules of the game
These power-shifts mean in practice that companies are involved now in a 
range of public issue governance decisions exemplified by those summarised in 
Table 4. This means that Milton Friedman’s “rules of the game” have changed. 
These new rules of the game are a hybrid of laws and regulations applied 
extra-territorially, heightened societal expectations, and ethical/moral 
sentiment and judgement. In effect, the business case just got extended. 
TABLE 4  
Examples of public issue governance decisions faced by 
companies:
x Taking a precautionary approach to global warming 
x Whether or not to develop the use of genetically moderated crops 
x Marketing life-saving drugs in poor countries at lower prices 
x Whether or not to pursue money laundering 
x Doing pre-investment environmental and social impact assessment 
x How to manage conflicting interests of a national government versus 
those of an indigenous community where a company is operating 
x Whether or not to pursue global policy on human rights or accept 
local practices 
x Which human rights to prioritise when faced with an “on-the-ground” 
dilemma 
x Whether or not to raise “awkward” issues with host government 
x How to manage relationship with state security forces during internal 
conflict
x To go in, stay in, or pull out of a ‘rogue state’ 
When a leading energy company decides that the evidence of global warming 
is too great to ignore and publicly adopts policies to restrict its greenhouse gas 
emissions and pursue alternative energy sources, this has a public impact. The 
impact, for instance, in terms of opinion-leadership, may be far wider than just 
on the company itself.  A decision to fund research that will try to obscure the 
global warming debate is similarly an intervention in public issue governance. 
When an agro-chemical company decides to develop GM (genetically-modified) 
technology without due regard to public opinion, it is capable of creating a 
climate of anti-GM opinion that sets back by many years a development which 
may have an answer to world food shortages. Pharmaceutical companies have 
the capability of providing many life-saving drugs to poor countries and 
increasingly are expected to be more imaginative in looking for alternative 
funding and delivery strategies. Banks, most of which are now international in 
reach, have the capability of tracking money-laundering and other money 
flows of dubious legality, which could considerably reduce the misappropriation 
of public funds. All these actual cases illustrate the new global realities for 
business. 
In a well-regulated country, when a company wants to undertake a major 
investment project, it is subject to planning regulations and probably a public 
enquiry which has the power to make adjustments to the plans in the face of 
public opposition; or in an extreme case to stop the development altogether. 
In many parts of the world this simply does not happen, sometimes because of 
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poor regulatory processes and sometimes because those in power in 
government want the revenues and are not interested in the external costs of 
the project on the local communities affected. In these cases companies on 
their own initiative are increasingly expected by non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and public opinion more widely, to undertake both pre-
investment and on-going environmental and social impact analyses in full 
collaboration with affected stakeholders. In this way, plan modifications and 
compensation can be openly negotiated and may even (though rarely) lead to 
a project being abandoned entirely. This, again, is active involvement by 
companies in public interest issue governance. 
Companies are clearly expected to obey the laws of the country in which they 
operate. But what should they do if those laws encourage ethical, 
environmental and/or human rights standards below those required by 
international law or principles established by voluntary groupings of 
companies, NGOs and government representatives in other parts of the world? 
In such circumstances companies may stand firm with their principles, for 
instance with a ‘No Bribes’ policy. They may decide to give priority to benefits 
they can bring through creating jobs and livelihoods, while deferring concerns 
over local denial of equal opportunity rights and labour conditions. They may 
decide to raise with government ministers, issues of human rights abuses, 
such as use of forced labour or displacement of people. Both the Voluntary 
Principles on Security and Human Rights16 and the Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative17 are examples of voluntary undertakings by global 
companies to maintain internationally agreed standards of behaviour when 
operating in weak governance zones, and to raise issues of concern directly 
with relevant government authorities. In “worst case” scenarios, companies 
may be expected to disinvest in countries with pariah governments. This is, of 
course, a much more dilemma-strewn decision than whether to invest in the 
first place.    
These and many more examples are decisions which companies cannot avoid. 
Clearly, each company needs to be very careful to understand and work within 
its sphere of influence and the materiality to its business of the issue in 
question. But companies do have the power to make a difference for good or 
bad. These are, in effect, decisions of governance over public policy issues. To 
step aside and do nothing is as much a decision with implications for the issue 
in question, as to get directly involved. In a well-governed world the ‘leave it 
to market forces within the rules of the game’ case would be persuasive. But 
the world is not well-governed and shows no signs of being so in the 
foreseeable future. The case for active CR by companies to contribute to filling 
the de facto governance gap at the international level and in states with weak 
or despotic government, is inescapable. However, it is a very imperfect and – 
ideally – a transitory scenario. This is not something that companies are 
designed for, or are particularly good at. Companies are not natural guardians 
of the public interest. Their legitimacy is only that of being in situations where 
there is weak or ineffective governance, and where they have the power to 
16 The Voluntary Principles on Security & Human Rights - www.voluntaryprinciples.org - accessed December 
20th 2007
17 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative www.eitransparency.org - accessed December 20th 2007  
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make a positive difference to an issue as, for instance, in the cases of the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative mentioned above.  
4. From de facto to de jure Governance?
The final issue is how company engagement in these issues can eventually 
translate into the establishment of more legitimate, de jure governance 
processes, rather than seeming to relieve governments of their proper 
responsibilities and prolonging a series of “second best” outcomes. First, it 
should be said that second best or less than perfect outcomes are often 
preferable to the status quo in a world that is struggling to govern itself, 
making de facto governance processes work as well as possible would seem to 
be preferable to waiting for more formal, de jure governance, which may take 
a long time to evolve. To encourage the latter requires companies to approach 
their involvement as transparently as possible and work with all relevant 
stakeholders, including governments – so easily said but so hard to do, with 
competing interests, strong sensitivities and limited resources. 
“Tomorrow’s Global Company: Challenges and Choices” suggests that one key 
role now for Global Companies is setting standards – these may be at the level 
of the individual firm; voluntary, industry-wide agreements; or the fore-runner 
of mandatory national or international standards18. Professor Atle Midttun from 
the Norwegian School of Management has suggested that individual companies 
adopting corporate responsibility may be self-regulators. Midttun further 
argues that where a group of companies together adopt higher standards of 
ethical, environmental and / or social performance, they are co-regulating. 
Interestingly, Midttun is not a political scientist – he teaches innovation at the 
Norwegian School of Management in Oslo. 
Midttun further suggests that putting some kind of democratic framework 
around these voluntary company commitments may also be one of the ways of 
addressing some of the current criticisms of corporate responsibility as being 
either undemocratic or anti-competitive19. The Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative is a good example of this process. The EITI began after 
BP tried and failed to publicise the royalty payments it was making to the 
Angolan Government. With the help of the British Government and 
subsequently of several other governments, BP has persuaded other energy 
companies to increase transparency and publish what they pay. Several 
governments have now endorsed and put their weight behind the EITI. 
Similarly, by helping to fund the secretariat of the Carbon Disclosure Project, 
governments are endorsing this voluntary initiative to get the world’s largest 
companies to state whether they have carbon reduction strategies in place. 
Individual governments could have passed laws requiring companies in their 
jurisdictions to answer questions about carbon reduction strategies. In 
practice, the Carbon Disclosure Project – endorsed by more than 300 of the 
18 “Challenges and Choices: Tomorrow’s Global Company Inquiry 2007 Final Report from Tomorrow’s Global 
Company Inquiry, London, June 2007 – www.tomorrowscompany.com 
19 Prof Atle Midttun – Norwegian School of Management, Oslo – 2007 – European Academy for Business in 
Society Annual Colloquium September 2007 -  noted by authors  
http://www.eabis.org/csrplatform/colloquium/2007/2007proceedings/SecondPlenary/ 
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world’s largest institutional investors, representing more than $41 trillion of 
funds – probably has more sway than most governments20.
With many national governments apparently unwilling to help lead the drive 
for better global governance, increasing numbers of people are looking to non-
governmental or civil society organisations to represent particular interests, 
such as the environment and human rights. NGOs, with varying degrees of 
popular legitimacy, act as watchdogs and whistle-blowers about corporate 
behaviour. They have become a form of countervailing power to that wielded 
by large companies, often commanding greater public trust than companies 
particularly in Europe21, although with considerably less financial resources and 
often less formal rights in existing law.  
By 2000 there were more than 37,000 International NGOs and over 20,000 
transnational NGO networks22. Within this civil society, there is considerable 
difference of opinion as to whether to pursue undiluted oppositional tactics to 
what companies are doing or whether to engage in constructive dialogue and 
even partnership.  Indeed more radical groups, like London Rising Tide23
openly criticise the likes of WWF and Greenpeace for taking part in joint 
conferences with leading oil and mining companies, for selling out to big 
business and thus contributing to what the radicals call the plague of 
‘greenwash’.  It is interesting to note that only 10 years ago it was Greenpeace 
which first recognised the emerging power of civil society to pressurise 
companies independently of government action, in its high profile action 
against Shell over the disposal of the Brent Spar oil storage unit in the North 
Atlantic.  Since then, the campaigning environmental organisation, like several 
other leading NGOs, has grown as a ‘political’ institution and has been drawn 
into more of a problem-solving role alongside its whistle-blowing one.  It has 
come to take a more pragmatic view that for all their failings, companies do 
have a huge role to play in solving the world’s major problems.  They have to 
be part of the solutions not just a cause of the problems, and they need all the 
help they can be given, to do it well24.
Table 5 suggests one model of the stages that a contentious issue affecting 
business, may pass through from the perspective of NGOs campaigning on the 
issue. 
20 see www.cdproject.net – accessed Dec 21st 2007  
21  see Richard Edelman Address to Ethical Corporation Magazine conference, New York, 3 October 2002 
“ReEvolution of Business: A Mandala for the 21st Century”
www.ethicalcorp.com/content.asp?ContentID=346 
22 (see UNDP Human Development Report 2002 - Chapter 5: Deepening democracy at the global level).
23 www.londonrisingtide.org.uk  accessed December 20th 2007 
24 For an early articulation of such a constructive NGO role see Schwartz,  Peter and Gibb, Blair  (1999) 
‘When Good Companies do bad things Responsibility and Risk in an Age of Globalization’, page 135,  .John 
Wiley & Sons 
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TABLE 525
1. An activist NGO floats an issue as a problem 
2. NGOs, usually in coalition, initiate a campaign to which public opinion 
responds  
3. With enough public response, governmental or intergovernmental bodies 
become involved, and NGOs participate in drafting new laws, regulations or 
codes 
4. NGOs become active monitors of legal/regulatory/code compliance 
5. NGOs become resources to corporations in future policy decisions. 
The BP and Amnesty International engagement  (Box 1) over the human rights 
issues regarding the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (‘BTC’) pipeline, which ultimately 
contributed to the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) review of its 
project lending rules, is one example of how these new de facto governance 
processes can translate into more formal rules of the game26.
BOX 1 Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (‘BTC’) pipeline case-study 
Following publication by BP of the company’s Host Government Agreement 
(HGA) with Turkey in 2003, Amnesty International expressed concerns 
that the agreement was most likely to lead to denial of the human rights 
of those living in the area of the pipeline. Amnesty argued that the HGA 
could have a ‘chilling effect’ on the Turkish government’s willingness to 
enforce their human rights, labour rights, and environmental obligations, 
which it had agreed under international treaties27.  Amnesty warned that 
the land acquisition could have the effect of resettling the 30,000 people 
who would be forced to give up their land rights to make way for the 
pipeline; there could be inadequate enforcement of health and safety 
legislation to protect workers and local people; and there could be a 
serious risk to the human rights of any individuals who protested against 
the pipeline.  Amnesty expressed particular concern about the HGA clause 
indicating that host countries are liable for any disruption to the economic 
equilibrium of the project. It feared that this would create a disincentive 
for the Turkish government to protect human rights because it had agreed 
to pay compensation to the BTC consortium if the pipeline construction or 
operation were disturbed.    
BP listened to Amnesty’s concerns but responded by asserting that the 
Company’s well known strong human rights policy, based on the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, meant that it could be trusted not to deny 
human rights associated with the construction and operating of the 
pipeline.  Amnesty was not persuaded, pointing to other failings BP had 
experienced and suggesting that when times get tough the lawyers tend 
to win the argument. The impasse was finally resolved when Amnesty 
called a public meeting to launch the publication of its report ‘Human 
Rights on the Line’28, which demonstrated its concerns in detail. A week 
25 ibid 
26 The BTC Pipeline Case Study, Global Compact Learning Forum 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/communication_on_progress/4.2/4.2.4/doa_bp.pdf accessed 
December 20th 2007 
27 http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/history.htm ; http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html  
28 Human Rights on the Line: Amnesty International, May 2003 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/business/humanrightsontheline.pdf accessed December 20th 2007  
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later BP asked Amnesty for further talks. The Company now accepted 
Amnesty’s conclusions and after lengthy negotiations between lawyers 
representing the two organisations a compromise settlement was reached 
in which a Deed Poll (a legally binding contract designed to protect the 
rights of the Turkish government to promote and regulate human rights 
and environmental issues) was drafted and then signed by the BTC 
Project.  Subsequent to this agreement, BP and Amnesty have had 
discussions with the IFC, a subsidiary of the World Bank, which provided 
loans to the BTC project.  This has contributed to the IFC’s review of its 
lending conditions to take more account of human rights issues.   
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CONCLUSIONS 
What is the ultimate governance vision?  Is it a world of internationally 
collaborating, representative national governments holding corporations to 
account through strong internal regulations backed by strong international law 
and enforcement institutions? Can that realistically be achieved in time before 
irreversible and calamitous climate and other environmental and social 
degradation takes place? If this theoretical “ideal” public governance state 
were to occur, the case for CR might revert to that on which there does seem 
to be a consensus: that is, responsible behaviour by companies should rest on 
a business case backed up by strong ethical values and enforced rules of the 
game. In the meantime, given the likelihood of a lasting deficit of enforced 
rules of the game, the case for CR, i.e. for companies being expected to try 
deliberately to do good things beyond the minimum required to pursue their 
immediate financial targets, is a strong one. As that expectation is increasingly 
being backed up by NGO action, usually targeted at the big trans-national 
companies and brands, responsible involvement in public issues is becoming 
an unavoidable part of the new rules of the game. In time, perhaps, these 
companies will come to recognise that their interest lies in a creating a level 
playing field on which to compete.  
All those involved in this pragmatic, de facto governance process should see 
this – at least theoretically – as an ultimately transitory, if long term, 
phenomenon and work together to assist the development of better de jure
governance processes.  It must be in the long term interest of leading 
companies and the associations which represent them, to work tirelessly 
towards the creation of more effective regulations by legitimate governments 
so that they can compete fairly with other companies which now take a free 
ride on CR matters. That implies that leading companies and their associations 
should be actively lobbying governments for better regulation, not less. If and 
when the governance of company impacts on environmental and social issues 
is firmly brought within the rules of the game, then CR can perhaps return to 
being largely discretionary – but that time is a long way off. It remains an 
open question, in the face of the greatly increased complexity of the issues 
facing global society, whether governments alone, however well-organised, 
professional and far-seeing they are, can even theoretically, be able to solve 
the major environmental and societal issues on their own. 
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